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@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
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apiVersion: v1
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kind: ConfigMap
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metadata:
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name: rauthy-config
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namespace: rauthy
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data:
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rauthy.cfg: |+
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#####################################
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############## ACCESS ###############
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#####################################
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# If the User Registration endpoint should be accessible by anyone.
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# If not, an admin must create each new user. (default: false)
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#OPEN_USER_REG=true
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# Can be used when 'OPEN_USER_REG=true' to restrict the domains
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# for a registration. For instance, set it to
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# 'USER_REG_DOMAIN_RESTRICTION=gmail.com' to allow only
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# registrations with 'user@gmail.com' (default: '')
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#USER_REG_DOMAIN_RESTRICTION=some-domain.com
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# If set to 'true', this will validate the remote peer IP address with
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# each request and compare it with the IP which was used during the initial
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# session creation / login. If the IP is different, the session will be
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# rejected. This is a security hardening and prevents stolen access credentials,
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# for instance if an attacker might have copied the encrypted session cookie
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# and the XSRF token from the local storage from a user. However, this event
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# is really unlikely, since it may only happen if an attacker has direct access
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# to the machine itself.
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#
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# If your users are using mobile networks and get new IP addresses all the time,
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# this means they have to do a new login each time. This is no big deal at all with
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# Webauthn / FIDO keys anyway and should not be a reason to deactivate this feature.
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#
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# Caution: If you are running behind a reverse proxy which does not provide the
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# X-FORWARDED-FOR header correctly, or you have the PROXY_MODE in this config
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# disabled, this feature will not work. You can validate the IPs for each session
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# in the Admin UI. If these are correct, your setup is okay.
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#
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# (default: true)
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#SESSION_VALIDATE_IP=true
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# This value may be set to 'true' to disable the binding cookie checking
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# when a user uses the password reset link from an E-Mail.
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#
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# When using such a link, you will get a so called binding cookie. This
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# happens on the very first usage of such a reset link. From that moment on,
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# you will only be able to access the password reset form with this very
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# device and browser. This is just another security mechanism and prevents
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# someone else who might be passively sniffing network traffic to extract
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# the (unencrypted) URI from the header and just use it, before the user
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# has a change to fill out the form. This is a mechanism to prevent against
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# account takeovers during a password reset.
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#
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# The problem however are companies (e.g. Microsoft) who scan their customers
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# E-Mails and even follow links and so on. They call it a "feature". The
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# problem is, that their servers get this binding cookie and the user will be
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# unable to use this link himself. The usage of this config option is highly
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# discouraged, but since everything moves very slow in big enterprises and
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# you cannot change your E-Mail provider quickly, you can use it do just make
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# it work for the moment and deal with it later.
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#
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# default: false
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#UNSAFE_NO_RESET_BINDING=false
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#####################################
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############# BACKUPS ###############
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#####################################
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# Cron job for automatic data store backups (default: "0 0 4 * * * *")
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# sec min hour day_of_month month day_of_week year
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#BACKUP_TASK="0 0 4 * * * *"
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# The name for the data store backups. The current timestamp
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# will always be appended automatically. (default: rauthy-backup-)
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#BACKUP_NAME="rauthy-backup-"
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# All backups older than the specified hours will be cleaned up
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# automatically (default: 720)
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#BACKUP_RETENTION_LOCAL=720
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#####################################
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############## CACHE ################
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#####################################
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# If the cache should start in HA mode or standalone
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# accepts 'true|false', defaults to 'false'
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#HA_MODE=false
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# The connection strings (with hostnames) of the HA instances
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# as a CSV.
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# Format: 'scheme://hostname:port'
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#HA_HOSTS="http://rauthy-0.rauthy:8000, http://rauthy-1.rauthy:8000, http://rauthy-2.rauthy:8000"
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# Overwrite the hostname which is used to identify each cache member.
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# Useful in scenarios, where for instance all members are on the same host with
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# different ports or for testing.
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#HOSTNAME_OVERWRITE="rauthy-0.rauthy:8080"
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## Define buffer sizes for channels between the components
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# Buffer for client requests on the incoming stream - server
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# side (default: 128)
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# Make sense to have the CACHE_BUF_SERVER set to:
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# `(number of total HA cache hosts - 1) * CACHE_BUF_CLIENT`
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# In a non-HA deployment, set the same size for both
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#CACHE_BUF_SERVER=128
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# Buffer for client requests to remote servers for all cache
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# operations (default: 128)
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#CACHE_BUF_CLIENT=128
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# Secret token, which is used to authenticate the cache members
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#CACHE_AUTH_TOKEN=SomeSuperSecretAndVerySafeToken1337
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## Connections Timeouts
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# The Server sends out keepalive pings with configured timeouts
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# The keepalive ping interval in seconds (default: 5)
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#CACHE_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL=5
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# The keepalive ping timeout in seconds (default: 5)
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#CACHE_KEEPALIVE_TIMEOUT=5
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# The timeout for the leader election. If a newly saved leader
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# request has not reached quorum after the timeout, the leader
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# will be reset and a new request will be sent out.
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# CAUTION:
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# This should not be lower than CACHE_RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_UPPER,
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# since cold starts and elections will be problematic in that
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# case.
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# value in seconds, default: 15
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#CACHE_ELECTION_TIMEOUT=15
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# These 2 values define the reconnect timeout for the HA Cache
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# Clients. The values are in ms and a random between these 2
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# will be chosen each time to avoid conflicts and race conditions
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# (default: 2500)
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#CACHE_RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_LOWER=2500
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# (default: 5000)
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#CACHE_RECONNECT_TIMEOUT_UPPER=5000
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#####################################
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############ DATABASE ###############
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#####################################
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# The database driver will be chosen at runtime depending on
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# the given DATABASE_URL format. Examples:
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# Sqlite: 'sqlite:data/rauthy.db' or 'sqlite::memory:'
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# Postgres: 'postgresql://User:PasswordWithoutSpecialCharacters@localhost:5432/DatabaseName'
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#
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# NOTE: The password in this case should be alphanumeric. Special
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# characters could cause problems in the connection string.
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#
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# CAUTION:
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# To make the automatic migrations work with Postgres15, when
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# you do not want to just use the `postgres` user, You need
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# to have a user with the same name as the DB / schema. For
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# instance, the following would work without granting extra
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# access to the `public` schema which is disabled by default
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# since PG15:
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#
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# database: rauthy
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# user: rauthy
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# schema: rauthy with owner rauthy
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#
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#DATABASE_URL=sqlite::memory:
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#DATABASE_URL=sqlite:data/rauthy.db
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#DATABASE_URL=postgresql://rauthy:123SuperSafe@localhost:5432/rauthy
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# Max DB connections - irrelevant for SQLite (default: 5)
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#DATABASE_MAX_CONN=5
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# If specified, the current Database, set with DATABASE_URL,
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# will be DELETED and OVERWRITTEN with a migration from the
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# given database with this variable. Can be used to migrate
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# between different databases.
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#
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# !!! USE WITH CARE !!!
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#MIGRATE_DB_FROM=sqlite:data/rauthy.db
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# Disables the housekeeping schedulers (default: false)
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#SCHED_DISABLE=true
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#####################################
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############# E-MAIL ################
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#####################################
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# Will be used as the prefix for the E-Mail subject for each E-Mail
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# that will be sent out to a client.
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# This can be used to further customize your deployment.
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# default: "Rauthy IAM"
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EMAIL_SUB_PREFIX="Rauthy IAM"
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SMTP_USERNAME=
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#SMTP_PASSWORD=
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SMTP_URL=
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# Format: "Rauthy <rauthy@localhost.de>"
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SMTP_FROM=
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#####################################
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###### ENCRYPTION / HASHING #########
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#####################################
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# Format: "key_id/enc_key another_key_id/another_enc_key" - the
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# enc_key itself must be exactly 32 characters long and and
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# should not contain special characters.
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# The ID must match '[a-zA-Z0-9]{2,20}'
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#ENC_KEYS="bVCyTsGaggVy5yqQ/S9n7oCen53xSJLzcsmfdnBDvNrqQ63r4 q6u26onRvXVG4427/3CEC8RJWBcMkrBMkRXgx65AmJsNTghSA"
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ENC_KEY_ACTIVE=bVCyTsGaggVy5yqQ
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# M_COST should never be below 32768 in production
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ARGON2_M_COST=32768
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# T_COST should never be below 1 in production
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ARGON2_T_COST=3
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# P_COST should never be below 2 in production
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ARGON2_P_COST=2
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# Limits the maximum amount of parallel password hashes at
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# the exact same time to never exceed system memory while
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# still allowing a good amount of memory for the argon2id
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# algorithm (default: 2)
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# CAUTION: You must make sure, that you have at least
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# (MAX_HASH_THREADS * ARGON2_M_COST / 1024) + ~30 MB of memory
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# available.
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MAX_HASH_THREADS=1
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# The time in ms when to log a warning, if a request waited
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# longer than this time. This is an indicator, that you have
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# more concurrent logins than allowed and may need config
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# adjustments,
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# if this happens more often. (default: 500)
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#HASH_AWAIT_WARN_TIME=500
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# JWKS auto rotate cronjob. This will (by default) rotate
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# all JWKs every 1. day of the month. If you need smaller
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# intervals, you may adjust this value. For security reasons,
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# you cannot fully disable it.
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# In a HA deployment, this job will only be executed on the
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# current cache leader at that time.
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# Format: "sec min hour day_of_month month day_of_week year"
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# default: "0 30 3 1 * * *"
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JWK_AUTOROTATE_CRON="0 30 3 1 * * *"
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#####################################
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####### EPHEMERAL CLIENTS ###########
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#####################################
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# Can be set to 'true' to allow the dynamic client lookup via URLs as
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# 'client_id's during authorization_code flow initiation.
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# default: false
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#ENABLE_EPHEMERAL_CLIENTS=false
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# Can be set to 'true' to enable WebID functionality like needed
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# for things like Solid OIDC.
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# default: false
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ENABLE_WEB_ID=true
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# If set to 'true', 'solid' will be added to the 'aud' claim from the ID token
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# for ephemeral clients.
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# default: false
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#ENABLE_SOLID_AUD=false
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# If set to 'true', MFA / Passkeys will be forced for ephemeral clients.
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# default: false
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#EPHEMERAL_CLIENTS_FORCE_MFA=false
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# The allowed flows separated by ' ' for ephemeral clients.
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# default: "authorization_code"
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#EPHEMERAL_CLIENTS_ALLOWED_FLOWS="authorization_code refresh_token"
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# The allowed scopes separated by ' ' for ephemeral clients.
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# default: "openid profile email webid"
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#EPHEMERAL_CLIENTS_ALLOWED_SCOPES="openid profile email webid"
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# The lifetime in seconds ephemeral clients will be kept inside the cache.
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# default: 3600
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#EPHEMERAL_CLIENTS_CACHE_LIFETIME=3600
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#####################################
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######### EVENTS / AUDIT ############
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#####################################
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# The E-Mail address event notifications should be sent to.
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# If left empty, no messages will be sent to Slack.
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#EVENT_EMAIL=admin@localhost.de
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# Matrix variables for event notifications.
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# `EVENT_MATRIX_USER_ID` and `EVENT_MATRIX_ROOM_ID` are mandatory.
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# Depending on your Matrix setup, additionally one of
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# `EVENT_MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN` or `EVENT_MATRIX_USER_PASSWORD` is needed.
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# If you log in to Matrix with User + Password, you may use `EVENT_MATRIX_USER_PASSWORD`.
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# If you log in via OIDC SSO (or just want to use a session token you can revoke),
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# you should provide `EVENT_MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN`.
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# If both are given, the `EVENT_MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN` will be preferred.
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#
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# If left empty, no messages will be sent to Slack.
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# Format: `@<user_id>:<server address>`
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#EVENT_MATRIX_USER_ID=
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# Format: `!<random string>:<server address>`
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#EVENT_MATRIX_ROOM_ID=
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#EVENT_MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN=
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#EVENT_MATRIX_USER_PASSWORD=
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# Optional path to a PEM Root CA certificate file for the Matrix client.
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#EVENT_MATRIX_ROOT_CA_PATH=path/to/my/root_ca_cert.pem
|
|
|
|
|
# May be set to disable the TLS validation for the Matrix client.
|
|
|
|
|
# default: false
|
|
|
|
|
#EVENT_MATRIX_DANGER_DISABLE_TLS_VALIDATION=false
|
|
|
|
|
# The default behavior is, that Rauthy will panic at startup if it cannot connect
|
|
|
|
|
# to a configured Matrix server. The reason is that event notifications cannot be
|
|
|
|
|
# dropped silently.
|
|
|
|
|
# However, if you use a self-hosted Matrix server which uses Rauthy as its OIDC
|
|
|
|
|
# provider and both instances went offline, you will have a chicken and egg problem:
|
|
|
|
|
# - Rauthy cannot connect to Matrix and will panic
|
|
|
|
|
# - Your Matrix server cannot connect to Rauthy and will panic
|
|
|
|
|
# To solve this issue, you can temporarily set this value to 'true' and revert
|
|
|
|
|
# back, after the system is online again.
|
|
|
|
|
# default: false
|
|
|
|
|
#EVENT_MATRIX_ERROR_NO_PANIC=false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The Webhook for Slack Notifications.
|
|
|
|
|
# If left empty, no messages will be sent to Slack.
|
|
|
|
|
#EVENT_SLACK_WEBHOOK=
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The notification level for events. Works the same way as a logging level.
|
|
|
|
|
# For instance: 'notice' means send out a notifications for all events with
|
|
|
|
|
# the info level or higher.
|
|
|
|
|
# Possible values:
|
|
|
|
|
# - info
|
|
|
|
|
# - notice
|
|
|
|
|
# - warning
|
|
|
|
|
# - critical
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 'warning'
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_NOTIFY_LEVEL_EMAIL=warning
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 'notice'
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_NOTIFY_LEVEL_MATRIX=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 'notice'
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_NOTIFY_LEVEL_SLACK=notice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Define the level from which on events should be persisted inside the
|
|
|
|
|
# database. All events with a lower level will be lost, if there is no
|
|
|
|
|
# active event subscriber.
|
|
|
|
|
# Possible values:
|
|
|
|
|
# - info
|
|
|
|
|
# - notice
|
|
|
|
|
# - warning
|
|
|
|
|
# - critical
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 'info'
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_PERSIST_LEVEL=info
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Define the number of days when events should be cleaned up from the database.
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 31
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_CLEANUP_DAYS=31
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a new user has been registered.
|
|
|
|
|
# default: info
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_NEW_USER=info
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a user has changed his E-Mail
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_USER_EMAIL_CHANGE=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a user has reset its password
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_USER_PASSWORD_RESET=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a user has been given the
|
|
|
|
|
# 'rauthy_admin' role
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_RAUTHY_ADMIN=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a new App version has been found
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_RAUTHY_VERSION=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after the JWKS has been rotated
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_JWKS_ROTATE=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after DB secrets have been migrated
|
|
|
|
|
# to a new key
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_SECRETS_MIGRATED=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a Rauthy instance has been
|
|
|
|
|
# started
|
|
|
|
|
# default: info
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_RAUTHY_START=info
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a Rauthy entered a healthy
|
|
|
|
|
# state (again)
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_RAUTHY_HEALTHY=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after a Rauthy entered an unhealthy
|
|
|
|
|
#state
|
|
|
|
|
# default: critical
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_RAUTHY_UNHEALTHY=critical
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after an IP has been blacklisted
|
|
|
|
|
# default: warning
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_IP_BLACKLISTED=warning
|
|
|
|
|
# The level for the generated Event after certain amounts of false
|
|
|
|
|
# logins from an IP
|
|
|
|
|
# default: critical
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_FAILED_LOGINS_25=critical
|
|
|
|
|
# default: critical
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_FAILED_LOGINS_20=critical
|
|
|
|
|
# default: warning
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_FAILED_LOGINS_15=warning
|
|
|
|
|
# default: warning
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_FAILED_LOGINS_10=warning
|
|
|
|
|
# default: notice
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_FAILED_LOGINS_7=notice
|
|
|
|
|
# default: info
|
|
|
|
|
EVENT_LEVEL_FAILED_LOGIN=info
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If set to 'true', it will disable the app version checker.
|
|
|
|
|
# This is a scheduled task that looks up the latest version periodically
|
|
|
|
|
# by doing a request to the Github API to check the latest release.
|
|
|
|
|
# This ignores any type of prerelease and will only notify for a new stable.
|
|
|
|
|
# default: false
|
|
|
|
|
#DISABLE_APP_VERSION_CHECK=false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
####### LIFETIMES / TIMEOUTS ########
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Set the grace time in seconds for how long in seconds the
|
|
|
|
|
# refresh token should still be valid after usage. Keep this
|
|
|
|
|
# value small, but do not set it to 0 with an HA deployment
|
|
|
|
|
# to not get issues with small HA cache latencies.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# If you have an external client, which does concurrent
|
|
|
|
|
# requests, from which the request interceptor wants to refresh
|
|
|
|
|
# the token, you may have multiple hits on the endpoint and all
|
|
|
|
|
# of them should be valid.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Caching is done on the endpoint itself, but grace time of 0
|
|
|
|
|
# will only be good for a single instance of rauthy.
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 5
|
|
|
|
|
#REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_TIME=5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Lifetime for offline tokens in hours (default: 720)
|
|
|
|
|
#OFFLINE_TOKEN_LIFETIME=720
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Session lifetime in seconds - the session can not be
|
|
|
|
|
# extended beyond this time and a new login will be forced.
|
|
|
|
|
# This is the session for the authorization code flow. (default: 14400)
|
|
|
|
|
#SESSION_LIFETIME=14400
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If 'true', a 2FA / MFA check will be done with each automatic
|
|
|
|
|
# token generation, even with an active session, which kind of
|
|
|
|
|
# makes the session useless with Webauthn enabled, but provides
|
|
|
|
|
# maximum amount of security.
|
|
|
|
|
# If 'false', the user will not get a MFA prompt with an active
|
|
|
|
|
# session at the authorization endpoint.
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: false)
|
|
|
|
|
#SESSION_RENEW_MFA=false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Session timeout in seconds
|
|
|
|
|
# When a new token / login is requested before this timeout hits
|
|
|
|
|
# the limit, the user will be authenticated without prompting for
|
|
|
|
|
# the credentials again.
|
|
|
|
|
# This is the value which can extend the session, until it hits
|
|
|
|
|
# its maximum lifetime set with SESSION_LIFETIME.
|
|
|
|
|
#SESSION_TIMEOUT=5400
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ML: magic link
|
|
|
|
|
# LT: lifetime
|
|
|
|
|
# Lifetime in minutes for reset password magic links (default: 30)
|
|
|
|
|
#ML_LT_PWD_RESET=30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Lifetime in minutes for the first password magic link, for
|
|
|
|
|
# setting the initial password. (default: 4320)
|
|
|
|
|
#ML_LT_PWD_FIRST=4320
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The interval in seconds in which keep-alives should be sent to SSE clients.
|
|
|
|
|
# Depending on your network setup, proxy timeouts, ...
|
|
|
|
|
# you may adjust this value to fit your needs.
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 30
|
|
|
|
|
#SSE_KEEP_ALIVE=30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
############# LOGGING ###############
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This is the log level for stdout logs
|
|
|
|
|
# Accepts: error, info, debug, trace (default: info)
|
|
|
|
|
#LOG_LEVEL=info
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This is a special config which allows the configuration of
|
|
|
|
|
# customized access logs. These logs will be logged with each
|
|
|
|
|
# request in addition to the normal LOG_LEVEL logs.
|
|
|
|
|
# The following values are valid:
|
|
|
|
|
# - Debug
|
|
|
|
|
# CAUTION: The Debug setting logs every information available
|
|
|
|
|
# to the middleware which includes SENSITIVE HEADERS
|
|
|
|
|
# DO NOT use the Debug level in a working production environment!
|
|
|
|
|
# - Verbose
|
|
|
|
|
# Verbose logging without headers - generates huge outputs
|
|
|
|
|
# - Basic
|
|
|
|
|
# Logs access to all endpoints apart from the Frontend ones
|
|
|
|
|
# which all js, css, ...
|
|
|
|
|
# - Modifying
|
|
|
|
|
# Logs only requests to modifying endpoints and skips all GET
|
|
|
|
|
# - Off
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: Modifying)
|
|
|
|
|
LOG_LEVEL_ACCESS=Basic
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
################ MFA ################
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If 'true', MFA for an account must be enabled to access the
|
|
|
|
|
# rauthy admin UI (default: true)
|
|
|
|
|
ADMIN_FORCE_MFA=false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
############## POW #################
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Proof of Work (PoW) configuration for Client Endpoints like
|
|
|
|
|
# User Registration. The iteration count for the PoW calculation
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: 1000000)
|
|
|
|
|
#POW_IT=1000000
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The expiration duration in seconds when a saved PoW should be
|
|
|
|
|
# cleaned up (default: 300)
|
|
|
|
|
#POW_EXP=300
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
############# SERVER ################
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The server address to listen on. Can bind to a specific IP.
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: 0.0.0.0)
|
|
|
|
|
#LISTEN_ADDRESS=0.0.0.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The listen ports for HTTP / HTTPS, depending on the
|
|
|
|
|
# activated 'LISTEN_SCHEME'
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 8080
|
|
|
|
|
#LISTEN_PORT_HTTP=8080
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 8443
|
|
|
|
|
#LISTEN_PORT_HTTPS=8443
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The scheme to use locally, valid values:
|
|
|
|
|
# http | https | http_https (default: http_https)
|
|
|
|
|
LISTEN_SCHEME=http
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The Public URL of the whole deployment
|
|
|
|
|
# The LISTEN_SCHEME + PUB_URL must match the HTTP ORIGIN
|
|
|
|
|
# HEADER later on, which is especially important when running
|
|
|
|
|
# rauthy behind a reverse proxy. In case of a non-standard
|
|
|
|
|
# port (80/443), you need to add the port to the PUB_URL
|
|
|
|
|
PUB_URL=localhost:8080
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# default value: number of available physical cores
|
|
|
|
|
#HTTP_WORKERS=1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# When rauthy is running behind a reverse proxy, set to true
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: false)
|
|
|
|
|
PROXY_MODE=false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# To enable or disable the additional HTTP server to expose the /metrics endpoint
|
|
|
|
|
# default: true
|
|
|
|
|
#METRICS_ENABLE=true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The IP address to listen on for the /metrics endpoint.
|
|
|
|
|
# You do not want to expose your metrics on a publicly reachable endpoint!
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 0.0.0.0
|
|
|
|
|
#METRICS_ADDR=0.0.0.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The post to listen on for the /metrics endpoint.
|
|
|
|
|
# You do not want to expose your metrics on a publicly reachable endpoint!
|
|
|
|
|
# default: 9090
|
|
|
|
|
#METRICS_PORT=9090
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If the Swagger UI should be served together with the /metrics route on the internal
|
|
|
|
|
# server. It it then reachable via:
|
|
|
|
|
# http://METRICS_ADDR:METRICS_PORT/docs/v1/swagger-ui/
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: true)
|
|
|
|
|
#SWAGGER_UI_INTERNAL=true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If the Swagger UI should be served externally as well. This makes the link in the
|
|
|
|
|
# Admin UI work.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# CAUTION: The Swagger UI is open and does not require any login to be seen!
|
|
|
|
|
# Rauthy is open source, which means anyone could just download it and see on their
|
|
|
|
|
# own, but it may be a security concern to just expose less information.
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: false)
|
|
|
|
|
#SWAGGER_UI_EXTERNAL=false
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
############### TLS #################
|
|
|
|
|
#####################################
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Rauthy TLS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Overwrite the path to the TLS certificate file in PEM
|
|
|
|
|
# format for rauthy (default: tls/tls.crt)
|
|
|
|
|
#TLS_CERT=tls/tls.crt
|
|
|
|
|
# Overwrite the path to the TLS private key file in PEM
|
|
|
|
|
# format for rauthy. If the path / filename ends with
|
|
|
|
|
# '.der', rauthy will parse it as DER, otherwise as PEM.
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: tls/tls.key)
|
|
|
|
|
#TLS_KEY=tls/tls.key
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## CACHE TLS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Enable / disable TLS for the cache communication
|
|
|
|
|
# (default: true)
|
|
|
|
|
CACHE_TLS=true
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The path to the server TLS certificate PEM file
|
|
|
|
|
# default: tls/redhac.cert-chain.pem
|
|
|
|
|
CACHE_TLS_SERVER_CERT=tls/cert-chain.pem
|
|
|
|
|
# The path to the server TLS key PEM file
|
|
|
|
|
# default: tls/redhac.key.pem
|
|
|
|
|
CACHE_TLS_SERVER_KEY=tls/key.pem
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The path to the client mTLS certificate PEM file. This is optional.
|
|
|
|
|
#CACHE_TLS_CLIENT_CERT=tls/cert-chain.pem
|
|
|
|
|
# The path to the client mTLS key PEM file. This is optional.
|
|
|
|
|
#CACHE_TLS_CLIENT_KEY=tls/key.pem
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If not empty, the PEM file from the specified location will be
|
|
|
|
|
# added as the CA certificate chain for validating
|
|
|
|
|
# the servers TLS certificate. This is optional.
|
|
|
|
|
#CACHE_TLS_CA_SERVER=tls/ca-chain.pem
|
|
|
|
|
# If not empty, the PEM file from the specified location will
|
|
|
|
|
# be added as the CA certificate chain for validating
|
|
|
|
|
# the clients mTLS certificate. This is optional.
|
|
|
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#CACHE_TLS_CA_CLIENT=tls/ca-chain.pem
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# The domain / CN the client should validate the certificate
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# against. This domain MUST be inside the
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# 'X509v3 Subject Alternative Name' when you take a look at
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# the servers certificate with the openssl tool.
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# default: redhac.local
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CACHE_TLS_CLIENT_VALIDATE_DOMAIN=redhac.local
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# Can be used if you need to overwrite the SNI when the
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# client connects to the server, for instance if you are
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# behind a loadbalancer which combines multiple certificates.
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# default: ""
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#CACHE_TLS_SNI_OVERWRITE=
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#####################################
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############# WEBAUTHN ##############
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#####################################
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# The 'Relaying Party (RP) ID' - effective domain name
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# (default: localhost)
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# CAUTION: When this changes, already registered devices will stop
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# working and users cannot log in anymore!
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RP_ID=localhost
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# Url containing the effective domain name
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# (default: http://localhost:8080)
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# CAUTION: Must include the port number!
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RP_ORIGIN=http://localhost:8080
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# Non critical RP Name
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# Has no security properties and may be changed without issues
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# (default: Rauthy Webauthn)
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RP_NAME='Rauthy Webauthn'
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# The Cache lifetime in seconds for Webauthn requests. Within
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# this time, a webauthn request must have been validated.
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# (default: 60)
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#WEBAUTHN_REQ_EXP=60
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# The Cache lifetime for additional Webauthn Data like auth
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# codes and so on. Should not be lower than WEBAUTHN_REQ_EXP.
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# The value is in seconds (default: 90)
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#WEBAUTHN_DATA_EXP=90
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# With webauthn enabled for a user, he needs to enter
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# username / password on a new system. If these credentials are
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# verified, rauthy will set an additional cookie, which will
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# determine how long the user can then use only (safe) MFA
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# passwordless webauthn login with yubikeys, apple touch id,
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# Windows hello, ... until he needs to verify his credentials
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# again.
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# Passwordless login is generally much safer than logging in
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# with a password. But sometimes it is possible, that the
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# Webauthn devices do not force the user to include a second
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# factor, which in that case would be a single factor login
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# again. That is why we should ask for the original password
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# in addition once in a while to set the cookie.
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# The value is in hours (default: 2160)
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#WEBAUTHN_RENEW_EXP=2160
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# This feature can be set to 'true' to force User verification
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# during the Webauthn ceremony. UV will be true, if the user
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# does not only need to verify its presence by touching the key,
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# but by also providing proof that he knows (or is) some secret
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# via a PIN or biometric key for instance. With UV, we have a
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# true MFA scenario where UV == false (user presence only)
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# would be a 2FA scenario (with password). Be careful with this
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# option, since Android and some special combinations of OS +
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# browser to not support UV yet.
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# (default: false)
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#WEBAUTHN_FORCE_UV=false
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# Can be set to 'true' to disable password expiry for users
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# that have at least one active passkey. When set to 'false',
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# the same password expiry from the set policy will apply to
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# these users as well.
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# With this option active, rauthy will ignore any password
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# expiry set by the password policy for Webauthn users.
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# default: true
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#WEBAUTHN_NO_PASSWORD_EXPIRY=true
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